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COMMENT

THE OTHER INSURANCE CRISIS: BAD FAITH REFUSAL
TO PAY FIRST-PARTY BENEFITS
MICHAEL KEITH GREEN

N RECENT years, a number of jurisdictions, including Florida,
have adopted various types of "tort reform ' in an effort to
remedy the much ballyhooed "liability insurance crisis. "2 Far less
publicized is the "insurance crisis" faced by insureds when auto,
health, life, property, or disability carriers deliberately refuse to
pay legitimate first-party claims.' When insurance companies refuse to pay, policyholders are forced to litigate to recover benefits
due ab initio. The consequences can be disastrous since the insured is usually "in unfortunate circumstances-his house may
have been burned down; he may be disabled and unable to work;
he may be hospitalized."' Moreover, insurers can often exploit
such exigent situations to compel highly favorable settlements,
thereby profiting from their own misconduct.'
In response, a majority of American jurisdictions now permit the
recovery of extra-contractual damages when insurers are found to
have handled first-party claims in bad faith.' These courts recog1.

See, e.g., Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695.

2. See Saks, In Search of the Lawsuit Crisis, 295 J.ACAD.

FLA. TRIAL LAW.

14 (April

1987). See generally Fort, Granger, Polston & Wilkes, Florida'sTort Reform: Response to a
Persistent Problem, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 505 (1986).
3. First-party benefits are paid directly to the insured when a covered contingency occurs. W. SHERNOFF, INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 501, at 5-3 (1984).
4. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. 331, 342, 396
A.2d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (Spaeth, J.,dissenting), aff'd, 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966
(1981). Further, when a "first party insurer 'wrongfully' withhold[s] policy benefits . .. an
insured can suffer injury not only to his economic well-being but to his emotional and physical health as well." W. YOUNG & E. HOLMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE

376 (2d ed. 1985).

5. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
6. Alabama: Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1981);
Alaska: United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1974); Arizona: Noble v.
National Am. Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 625 P.2d 866 (1981); Arkansas: Aetna Casualty
and Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d '463 (1984); California:
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Colorado: Savio v. Travelers Ins. Co., 678 P.2d 549 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985); Connecticut: Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection
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nize that consumers buy first-party insurance for "protection" '
against catastrophic eventualities, not an unjustified "court battle."' Indeed:
[T]he insured signs the insurance contract not for commercial advantage but for the peace of mind that if the anticipated injury
should occur, his claim for any physical or property damage covered by the policy will be treated reasonably by the insurer. The
insured certainly does not pay premiums in the expectation that
if he suffers the anticipated injury, the insurer will act in bad
faith ....9

Insurance companies market their products by explicitly holding
themselves out as fiduciaries, playing on mass expectations of
prompt, good faith treatment. 10 Yet many jurisdictions still characMut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375 A.2d 428 (Super. Ct. 1977); Delaware: Casson v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); District of Columbia: Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F. Supp 517 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Idaho: Sullivan v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 111 Idaho 304, 723 P.2d 848 (1986); Illinois: Ledingham v. Blue Cross
Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp., 29 Il1. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976); Indiana: Vernon Fire & Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976); Iowa: Pirkl v. Northwestern Mut.
Ins. Ass'n, 348 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1984); Mississippi: Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354
So. 2d 239 (Miss. 1977); Montana: First Sec. Bank v. Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 593 P.2d
1040 (1979); Nevada: United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d
1070 (1975); New Hampshire: Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d
576 (1978); New Jersey: Kosce v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 371, 377 A.2d
1234 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977); New Mexico: State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86
N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798 (1974); North Carolina: Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 57 N.C.
App. 346, 291 S.E.2d 331 (Ct. App. 1982); North Dakota: Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.
v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); Ohio: Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983); Oklahoma: Christian v. American Home
Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977); Rhode Island: Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417
A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980); South Carolina: Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C.
336, 306 S.E.2d 616 (1983); Wisconsin: Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675,
271 N.W.2d 368 (1968).
7. "The ... most significant characteristic of insurance contracts differentiating them
from ordinary, negotiated commercial contracts, is the increasing tendency of the public to
look upon the insurance policy not as a contract but as a special form of chattel. The typical
applicant buys 'protection' much as he buys groceries." 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 900, at
34 (2d ed. 1938).
8. See Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 925 (Ala. 1981) ("an insured
purchases insurance and not an unjustified court battle when he enters into the insurance
contract").
9. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. 331, 342, 396
A.2d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
10. "The insurer's promise to the insured to 'simplify his life,' to put him 'in good hands'
... or to be 'on his side' hardly suggests that the insurer will abandon the insured in his
time of need." Id. at 342-43, 396 A.2d at 786. "[I]nsurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries,
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terize the relationship as adversarial, that of debtor-creditor, when
an insured sues to compel performance. 1 Increasingly, courts
across the nation impose a fiduciary duty on first-party insurers.
When this obligation is breached, a distinct tort cause of action
arises: bad faith refusal to pay.
In this Comment the author traces the development of this relatively new right of action, surveys the reception it has received in
various jurisdictions, and examines the present state of "excess liability law.""2 He then focuses on Florida law, exploring the implications of the recently enacted "bad faith statute, ' 1 3 which has

been construed by the federal courts as legislative adoption of the
new tort,' although it has yet to be definitively interpreted by a
Florida court.' 5 Finally, the author argues that the federal court's
construction is correct and that Florida should align itself with the
growing majority of jurisdictions which permit extra-contractual
recovery when first-party insurers act in bad faith.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSURANCE EXCESS LIABILITY LAW

Decades ago, courts began to impose an independent duty on liability insurers to act in good faith when defending insureds against
third-party claims.' 6 Because the insurer assumes complete control
over the defense, it should act "with due regard for the interests of
the insured.

'17

This fiduciary obligation requires insurers to ade-

quately investigate claims, inform the insured about settlement offers, and settle within policy limits "where a reasonably prudent
and with the public's trust must go private responsibility consonant with that trust." Goodman & Seaton, Foreword: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns of
the California Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 309, 347 (1974).
11. See Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 317 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1975) (fiduciary relationship did not exist because "the parties occup[ied] a debtor-creditor type relationship").
12. YOUNG & HOLMES, supra note 4, at 375.
13. See FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
14. See Rowland v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 634 F. Supp. 613, 614-15 (M.D. Fla. 1986)
("[tihe enactment of FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b) 1 ... created an independent cause of action

for bad faith refusal to pay"); accord United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. v. Alliance Mortgage
Co., 644 F. Supp. 339, 340 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
15. Alliance Mortgage, 644 F. Supp. at 340 ("there are no controlling Florida decisions
which interpret subsection (1)(b)l [of Fla. Stat. § 624.155] .... ) (footnote omitted).
16. See, e.g., Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), aff'd on
rehearing, 235 N.W. 413 (1931); Auto. Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852
(1938); Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949). An insurer is

confronted with a third-party claim when the occurrence of a covered contingency renders
its insured liable for damages to a third party. SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 5.01, at 5-3.
17. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 922 (1981); see also Higgins v. Blue Cross, 319 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1982).
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person . .. would do so. '" When an insurer breaches this duty,
thereby exposing its insured to a judgment in excess of policy limits, the insured may recover the "excess" and other potential compensatory and punitive damages. 9
Many jurisdictions have extended this well-established doctrine
to encompass first-party claims, thereby adopting a new tort cause
of action for bad faith refusal to pay.2 0 The general rule was succinctly stated by the Nevada Supreme Court in United States Fi2
delity & Guarantee Co. v. Peterson:
Where an insurer fails to deal fairly and in good faith with its
insured by refusing without proper cause to compensate its insured for a loss covered by the policy such conduct may give rise
to a cause of action in tort for breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The duty violated arises not from the
terms of the insurance contract but is a duty imposed by law, the
violation of which is a tort.2"

Thus, an insured's recovery is not limited by the contract. Consequential and punitive damages are available based solely on the
effects of an insurer's bad faith handling of a valid first-party
claim.2
Prior to the development of an independent tort action, extracontractual recovery was authorized on a contract theory in a few
particularly egregious cases. In Coffey v. Northwestern Hospital
Association," the Oregon Supreme Court held an insurer liable for
physical pain and emotional distress suffered by its insured, an
18. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d at 785.
19. See, e.g., Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816, 817-818 (Fla. 1976) (excess recoverable based on bad faith, however compensatory damages are only available
where punitive damages are justified because the insurer engaged in active concealment,
misrepresentation or other overt and dishonest dealing); cf. Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154
Cal. App. 3d 688, 697-98, 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 537-38 (1984) (excess judgment and compensatory damages recoverable where the third-party insurer acts in bad faith, but punitive damages are available only if the insurer is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, including a
conscious disregard for the rights of the insured); accord Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co.,
682 P.2d 725, 739-40 (Mont. 1984).
20. See, e.g., California: Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Mississippi: Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239 (Miss.
1978); Ohio: Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983);
South Carolina: Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616
(1983).
21. 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975).
22. Id. at 618, 540 P.2d at 1071.
23. See, e.g., Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 566, 510 P.2d at 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
24. 96 Or. 100, 187 P. 407 (1920).
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elderly woman, because the insurer unreasonably refused to pay
for her covered medical care. The court held that such coverage
was within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was
made, and that the plaintiff's damages were a natural consequence
of Northwestern's wrongful denial of coverage.2 5 The court's rationale aptly summarizes the justification for a tort action and deserves to be quoted at length:
It is a well-known fact that as a rule these [health insurance] contracts are not entered into by the wealthy or well-to-do class[es] .
• .but by the poorer class[es] who seek thereby to provide themselves with medical or surgical assistance in case of sickness or
accident, without resort to humiliating public or private charity.
That a resort to such charity might result from a failure of defendant to keep its contract, was a contingency which would naturally be within the contemplation of both parties. That being
compelled to resort to it for the meager assistance it usually affords would be a source of humiliation and mental anguish to a
woman of average sensibilities, who for years had paid a monthly
premium to avoid such a contingency, goes without saying.
The verdict and judgment were legally and morally right, and
the . . .petition for rehearing is denied.26
Although it was a gradual process, cases such as Coffey provided
the impetus for the judicial imposition of an independent duty of
good faith on first-party insurers, a move which eventually permitted the creation of a new common law tort.
A.

California, Birthplace of a New Tort: Bad Faith Refusal to
Pay

California was the first jurisdiction to recognize a new tort action
based on bad faith handling of first-party claims. In Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co.,2 7 the Supreme Court of California held that
the duty of an insurer to act in good faith when defending thirdparty claims, and the obligation to deal fairly with an insured by
not unreasonably withholding first-party benefits, "are merely two
different aspects of the same duty. ' 28 Moreover, the court reasoned
that because the insurer's duty arises from a covenant of good faith
25. Id. at 102, 187 P. at 409.
26. Id.
27. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
28. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
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and fair dealing implied by law in every insurance contract, its
breach constitutes a tort. The court rejected Aetna's contention
that proof of an independent tort was necessary to prompt recovery, and thereby created an independent cause of action. Thus, an
insured like Gruenberg, "who as a result of [an insurer's] . . .tortious conduct loses his property and suffers mental distress may
recover not only for pecuniary loss but also for his mental
' 2
distress.
The next year, in Silberg v. CaliforniaLife Insurance Co.,s" the
same court refined its first-party bad faith doctrine. Mr. Silberg
was a self-employed operator of a small laundromat. He was seriously injured while trying to locate a fire on the premises. Silberg
was immediately hospitalized, surgery was performed, and his
medical insurer was notified. Initially, California Life denied coverage, without explaining why to either Silberg or the hospital. Later,
3
the company cited his pending workers' compensation claim.
Meanwhile, complications developed, additional surgery proved
necessary, and Silberg's medical bills mounted. But even after the
workers' compensation issue was settled, leaving California Life liable under the policy, the company persisted in denying
coverage.32
The consequences for Silberg were disastrous: he was ejected
from two hospitals,3 3 his original surgeon refused to provide further services, he was forced to exhaust his personal assets and borrow from relatives, his credit was ruined, he lost his business, his
utilities were disconnected, he was unable to buy prescribed medication, and even his wheelchair was repossessed. In the process he
experienced two nervous breakdowns, largely because California
29. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040,108 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Crisci
v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967)).
The court distinguished the outrageous conduct requirement set forth in the RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965), by reasoning that it only applied to the intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and not to tortious bad faith. Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 580, 510 P.2d at
1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
30. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
31. Id. at 464, 521 P.2d at 1111, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
32. It took this action aware Silberg had no alternative coverage. Moreover, it was contrary to a practice common in the industry: paying the benefits due and then recovering
directly from the state workers' compensation authority. Id. at 459-60, 521 P.2d at 1108, 113
Cal. Rptr. at 716.
33. Indeed, Silberg only gained admittance to a third hospital for essential surgery by
resorting "to a ruse"; he checked in on Saturday so the hospital wouldn't discover his lack of
coverage and send him packing until the following Monday. Id. at 459, 521 P.2d at 1107, 113
Cal Rptr. at 715.
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Life knowingly and unreasonably withheld payment for over a
year.
After reciting the principles laid down in Gruenberg, the court
focused on the startling incongruence between the insurer's representations and its actual behavior. Ironically, the policy application
read in large letters, "Protect Yourself Against the Medical Bills
That Can Ruin You."3 ' The court concluded that "[u]nder these
circumstances defendant's failure to afford relief to its insured
against the very eventuality insured against by the policy amounts
to a violation as a matter of law of its duty 3'of
good faith and fair
5
dealing implied in every [insurance] policy.
Accordingly, the court reinstated a jury verdict for $75,000 in
compensatory damages, overruling the superior court's finding that
the evidence was insufficient to support the award.3 In an oftquoted passage, the court then addressed the issue of punitive
damages:
It does not follow that because plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages that he is also entitled to exemplary damages. In
order to justify [such] an award . . . the defendant must be guilty
of oppression, fraud or malice. He must act with the intent to vex,
injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's
rights. While we have concluded that defendant violated its duty
of good faith and fair dealing, this alone does not necessarily establish that defendant acted with the requisite intent to injure
plaintiff.37
Subsequently, in Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,38 the
California court upheld an award of $740,000 in punitive damages
against an insurer who was held to have consciously sought to exploit the insured's desperate plight to coerce a favorable settlement.39 The facts in Neal were indeed compelling. Mrs. Neal suf34. Id. at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.

35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1109-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18.
Id. at 462-63, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (citations omitted).
21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978).
Specifically, the court stated:
[F]armers' refusal to accept ... [the] offer of settlement, and its subsequent submission of the matter to its attorney for opinion, were all part of a conscious
course of conduct, firmly grounded in established company policy, designed to
utilize the lamentable circumstances in which Mrs. Neal and her family found
themselves, and the exigent financial situation resulting from it, as a lever to force
a settlement more favorable to the company than the facts would otherwise have
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fered paralyzing spinal injuries when her automobile was struck by
an uninsured motorist. She spent over two months in the hospital.
The insurance company delayed payment, forcing arbitration over
the issue of contributory negligence, though it was aware no such
defense existed.40 The only real issue was a possible $5,000 offset
under the medical payment provisions against the $15,000 uninsured motorists policy limit. Yet, the company rejected a $10,000
settlement, offering a maximum of $5,000. The court held that a
reasonable jury could have concluded Farmers acted with the requisite malicious intent in conscious disregard for the Neals' rights,
justifying a large punitive award."1
The Gruenberg case marked the first opportunity for the California Supreme Court to apply its well-established third-party bad
faith doctrine to a first-party case.4 2 In doing so, the court simply
recognized that it is inequitable and logically inconsistent to require an insurer to give due regard to the interests of a tortfeasor
insured but to permit a lesser degree of care when a seriously ill
insured files a first-party claim. The court had ample justification
to extend the remedy, in light of the quasi-public role of the insurance industry;44 the reasonable expectations of insureds; 4 5 the adwarranted .... Clearly, the record supports an award of punitive damages against
Farmers.
Id. at 923, 582 P.2d at 987, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (footnotes omitted).
40. Farmers' attorney had already rendered an opinion that there was no defense to Mrs.
Neal's claim, as the arbitrator eventually ruled. Id. at 921, 582 P.2d at 985, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
394.
41. Id. at 914, 582 P.2d at 984, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 393. In a footnote, the court examined a
claims representative training manual used by Farmers to buttress its conclusion that the
conscious bad faith handling of Mrs. Neal's claim was based on established company operating procedure. Essentially, the manual instructed adjustors to seek settlement when insureds were most vulnerable because of sickness, a large recent purchase, or a death in the
family. Id. at 923 n.8, 582 P.2d at 987, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
42. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
43. A similar conclusion was reached by a federal court applying Florida law in Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla. 1976). Cf.
Kent Ins. Co. v. Hassan, 447 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
44. See Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 487, modified on rehearing, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal Rptr. 691
(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980) (quoting Goodman & Seaton, supra note 10, at 34647, "The insurers' obligations are . . . rooted in their status as purveyors of a vital service
labeled quasi-public in nature. Suppliers of services affected with a public interest must
take the public's interest seriously ... the obligations of [insurers] encompass qualities of
decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary").
45. See Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 818, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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hesive nature of insurance contracts;46 and the grossly unequal bargaining inherent in the relationship.
B.

Accelerating Recognition: The First-PartyBad Faith
Bandwagon Rolls

In the wake of Gruenberg, other states began to hold insurers
4 7
liable in tort for bad faith failure to pay valid first-party claims.
Consider the influential decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 48 in which the court extended the state's longstanding bad faith doctrine to encompass
first-party claims.49 It held that an insurer is guilty of bad faith
when it knowingly denies a first-party claim or does so in reckless
disregard for the rights of the insured.50 The central inquiry in
each case is whether a reasonable insurer would have delayed or
refused to pay the claim. If not, the insurer has breached a nonconsensual duty of good faith imposed by law. The insured may
then recover consequential damages and-where the facts warrant-punitive damages.
The recent case of Poling v. Wisconsin Physicians Service"' illustrates the Wisconsin rule. Mrs. Poling was a retired state
worker, holding group health insurance administered by Wisconsin
Physician Service (WPS). She entered the hospital suffering from
Parkinson's Disease and Alzheimer's Syndrome. The key issue was
whether the care she received was to be termed skilled, which was
covered under the policy, or custodial, which was not. WPS denied
46. Egan involved a bad faith refusal to pay disability benefits. The court noted that
"the relationship of insurer and insured is inherently unbalanced; the adhesive nature of
insurance contracts places the insurer in a superior bargaining position." Id. at 820, 598
P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (citations omitted). Moreover, if the dispute is litigated,
the insurance company's resources are virtually always vastly superior to the insured's, thus
making punitive damages available is merely an "attempt to restore balance in the contractual relationship." Id.
47. See, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1974); Standard
Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239 (Miss. 1977); Christian v. American Home Assurance
Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d
798 (1974).
48. 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978). The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently
adopted reasoning similar to that in Anderson. See Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 7 (Ala. 1981).
49. Wisconsin originally imposed a duty of good faith on insurers defending insureds
against third-party claims in Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257
(1930), aff'd on rehearing,235 N.W. 413 (1931).
50. Anderson, 85 Wis. 2d at 691, 271 N.W.2d at 376. Failure to properly investigate a
claim before rejecting it can constitute reckless disregard for the rights of an insured. Id.
51. 120 Wis. 2d 603, 357 N.W.2d 293 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
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coverage, initially claiming custodial care was administered. In response, Mrs. Poling's physician informed WPS that the care was
clearly skilled in nature since she was being provided with occupational therapy under nursing supervision. WPS then shifted
ground, denying coverage because there was no expectation of rehabilitation-when in fact no such requirement ever existed.52 The
court held that WPS' conduct constituted bad faith, satisfying
both prongs of the Anderson test. It upheld the jury's verdict
awarding the Polings $35,000 in compensatory damages 53 and
$100,00 in punitive damages."'
In Hoskins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 55 the Ohio Supreme
Court likewise recognized the new tort of bad faith failure to pay,
on facts very similar to Poling.6 Mrs. Hoskins was covered under
her husband's state employee group medical policy. She was hospitalized as the result of a stroke. Aetna paid initially, but later denied coverage when Mrs. Hoskins was transferred to a skilled nursing unit for physical therapy. It claimed such care was
convalescent-but even after it became clear that the care was in
fact skilled and therefore covered under the policy, Aetna still refused to pay.
The court applied the principles developed in various "refusalto-settle" cases5 7 to a "refusal-to-pay" claim, stating that insurers
have a "positive legal duty imposed by law" to act in good faith in
both situations. 8 A bad faith 59 breach of this duty will expose the
insurer to liability in tort. The court adopted this rule because of
52. Id. The guidelines followed by WPS did not require an expectation of rehabilitation
as a condition precedent to coverage. Moreover, the physician's report WPS claimed it relied on when it originally denied coverage was not prepared until two months later.
53. It was largely based on the mental distress suffered by the Polings as a proximate
consequence of being forced to spend their life savings and eventually seek public assistance. The court held that these facts were sufficient to satisfy the requirement, under Wisconsin law, that mental distress must be accompanied by other substantial damages to be
recoverable. Id. at 608-10, 357 N.W.2d at 297.
54. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish wanton disregard of
duty. Id. at 611, 375 N.W.2d at 298.
55. 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).
56. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962)
(third-party bad faith case).
58. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 277, 452 N.E.2d at 1320 (punitive damages are available
where an insurer acts with actual malice, which can be inferred from the circumstances).
59. The court explained that "[mere refusal to pay insurance is not, in itself, conclusive
of bad faith." Bad faith "imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty. . . . [Ilt also embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive
another." Id. (citations omitted).

19871

BAD FAITH

the fact that in the insurance field the insured usually has no
voice in the preparation of the insurance policy and because of
the great disparity between the economic positions of the parties.
. . and furthermore, at the time an insured party makes a claim
he . . . may be especially vulnerable to oppressive tactics by an
insurer seeking a settlement or a release. 0

In Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp,6a the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the equivalent of the tort of bad faith
refusal to pay when it carved out an exception to its general rule
that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of an insurance contract absent proof of an independent tort.8 2 The court recognized that the wrongful withholding of benefits due under a
first-party insurance contract, standing alone, constituted a serious
wrong, whether or not the insurer's bad faith conduct "conveniently fit the confines of a pre-determined tort."6 3 Punitive damages are available to serve the public interest by deterring similar
misconduct in the future. 4
The Mississippi Supreme Court has also recognized an independent tort cause of action predicated solely on bad faith failure to
pay. 5 The court took the position that punitive damages must be
available to protect insureds:
If an insurance company could not be subjected to punitive
damages it could intentionally and unreasonably refuse payment
of a legitimate claim with veritable impunity. To permit an insurer to deny a legitimate claim, and thus force a claimant to litigate with no fear that claimant's maximum recovery could exceed
the policy limits plus interest, would enable the insurer to pres60. Id. at 275, 452 N.E.2d at 1319 (citations omitted).
61. 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976).
62. The court does not use the words "bad faith," but instead requires "evidence as a
whole that a serious wrong, tortious in nature, has been committed... [and] that the public
interest will be served by the deterrent effect [of] punitive damages." Id. at 608, 349 N.E.
2d at 180 (emphasis in original).
63. Id.
64. Id. In Riverside Ins. Co. v. Pedigo, 430 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), a fire insurer
was held liable for compensatory and punitive damages because it misled the insureds as to
the grounds for delaying payment and subsequently denied their claim on an unsubstantiated allegation that they were arsonists.
65. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239 (Miss. 1977) ($25,000 punitive damages award upheld where an insurer refused to pay benefits due under a decreasing term life
insurance policy without any arguable reason for doing so).
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sure an insured to a point of desperation enabling the insurer to
force an inadequate settlement or avoid payment entirely. 6

Thus, ever increasingly, insurance companies that deliberately reject valid first-party claims can no longer seek shelter in the "impregnable citadel of the policy limit,"6 7 for it has been stormed by
concerned jurists seeking equity and a consistent public policy.
C.

ConsequentialDamages Under a Contract Theory: The New
Hampshire Approach

The New Hampshire Supreme Court has taken a unique approach to first-party bad faith cases.6 ' While it refuses to recognize
a new tort action per se, it does impose an implied contractual
duty of good faith and fair dealing.6 9 An insurer who breaches this
duty may be liable for reasonably foreseeable consequential damages in excess of policy limits. Because such a breach is not tortious, punitive damages are not available, nor are damages for
mental or emotional distress absent an independent tort.7 0 Without expressly saying so, New Hampshire has applied the Hadley v.
Baxendale rule of special damages to permit extra-contractual recovery. 7 1 The court's rationale is strikingly similar to that used to
justify an independent tort action:
66. Id. at 248.
67. YOUNG & HOLMES, supra note 4, at 375.
68. See Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978) (in a
suit arising out of an insurer's unreasonable refusal to pay first-party benefits under a commercial fire insurance policy, the court declined to recognize a tort cause of action but permitted recovery of consequential damages beyond policy limits).
69. Id. at 612, 392 A.2d at 580. To date, no other jurisdiction has taken New Hampshire's approach to this class of cases.
70. Id. at 614, 392 A.2d at 581. The court distinguished first-party from third-party
cases, in which it imposes full tort liability, by reciting the traditional rationale that in firstparty cases, the "insurer is not in a position to expose the insured . . .by virtue of its
exclusive control over the defense of the case." Id. See also Jarvis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122
N.H. 648, 448 A.2d 407 (1982). Here, in a stinging dissent, Justice Douglas distinguished
Lawton, which involved commercial fire insurance, and argued that New Hampshire should
recognize a tort action for an unreasonable refusal to pay first-party medical benefits. Id. at
657, 448 A.2d at 413. He rejected the majority's attempt to distinguish third- and first-party
relationships in such cases because, at least in the context of health insurance, a special
relationship does exist, such policies are purchased for "peace of mind and security in the
event of sickness." Id.
71. The recovery of consequential damages in an action on a first-party insurance contract could be upheld under both components of the Hadley rule of special damages: either
as naturally arising from the breach, or from being within the contemplation of the parties
when the contract was made. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). This is so
if one assumes it is reasonably foreseeable that an insured will face financial ruin when an
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To limit the insurer's liability to the policy limits plus interest...
would unnecessarily encourage insurers to delay settlement in an
attempt to coerce a financially pressured claimant into accepting
an unfair settlement, because its only liability would be to pay its
72
original obligation and interest.

Notwithstanding its doctrinal consistency, other jurisdictions have
not yet followed New Hampshire's approach, in large part because
punitive damages are considered essential to deter insurer misconduct.73 Indeed, to achieve such deterrence, an enhanced contract
remedy is a less efficient social policy. Without the spectre of punitive awards it is more tempting for insurers to act in bad faith and
"gamble on the results" of the ensuing litigation.74 A tort action
can more effectively discourage unethical insurer conduct in its inception, rather than merely compensating injured insureds for actual economic loss they were unable to mitigate or avoid ex post
facto.
D.

The New Tort Rejected: Rationale and Rationalization

A large minority of jurisdictions still refuse to allow the recovery
of extra-contractual damages when insurers wrongfully withhold
first-party benefits unless their actions are accompanied by an independent tort.75 This is so because these courts refuse to impose
insurer fails to pay for a covered catastrophic illness or other calamity, or that insurers are
aware of an insured's economic circumstances and, therefore, the disastrous effects its
breach will have on an insured. A number of commentators have argued that this is the
most logical approach to first-party bad faith cases. See, e.g., Harvey & Wiseman, First
Party Bad Faith: Common Law Remedies and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 72 Ky. L.J.
141 (1984).
72. Lawton, 118 N.H. at 612, 392 A.2d at 579.
73. See, e.g., Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 248 (Miss. 1978); Nichols v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 340, 306 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1983).
74. Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 278 Or. 53, 62, 562 P.2d 965, 969 (1977).

75. Florida: Smith v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d DCA), review
denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983); Georgia: Tate v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 149 Ga.
App. 123, 253 S.E.2d 775 (1978); Kansas: Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire
& Casualty Co., 232 Kan. 76, 652 P.2d 665 (1982); Louisiana: Bye v. American Income Life
Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 164 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 320 So. 2d 208 (La. 1975); Michigan:
Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); Minnesota: Haagenson v. National Farmer's Union Property & Casualty Co., 277 N.W.2d 648
(Minn. 1979); Missouri: Duncan v. Andrew County Mut. Ins. Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); Oregon: Santilli v. State Farm Ins. Co., 278 Or. 53, 562 P.2d 965 (1977); Pennsylvania: D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966
(1981); South Dakota: O'Neill v. Blue Cross of W. Iowa & S.D., 366 N.W.2d 816 (S.D.
1985); Texas: English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983); Utah: Beck v. Farmer's Ins.
Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

534

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:521

an independent fiduciary duty on insurers.7" An insured damaged
by "mere" bad faith in such a jurisdiction is limited to a contract
78
remedy 77 and, in some instances, limited statutory relief.
Ironically, many of the same jurisdictions require liability insurers to deal fairly and in good faith with tortfeasor insureds. 7
These jurisdictions justify divergent treatment of logically analogous situations on the grounds that the potential injury to the insured is greater in the context of third-party claims:
When an insured purchases liability insurance, he relinquishes
his right to control any litigation brought against him for conduct
which is covered under the policy, and he loses his right to negotiate a settlement with the opposing party. Moreover, when the settlement value of a case approaches the policy limits, it becomes
increasingly more tempting for the insurer to gamble on the results of litigation, for in refusing to settle under such circumstances, the insurer stands to lose little and gain much. The insured, however, has a strong interest in settlement so as to avoid
a judgment in excess of his coverage. Because of this conflict,
courts have held insurers to a high duty of good faith and fair
dealing when conducting settlement negotiations on behalf of
their insured.
Such considerations are not applicable outside the field of liability insurance. In cases involving the insurer's duty to pay
under policies for theft, fire, health, disability or life insurance,
the unique relationship which gives rise to the special duty of liability insurers to attempt to settle within their policy limits does
not arise. The insured, or his beneficiary, is not subject to the
76.

See, e.g., Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652; Santilli, 278 Or. at 62, 562 P.2d at 969.

77.

See Santilli, 278 Or. at 62, 562 P.2d at 969.

78. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 624.155(3) (Supp. 1986) (providing for damages, court costs,
and reasonable attorney's fees); GA. CODE ANN. § 33(4)6 (1982) (providing for a bad faith
penalty and for reasonable attorney's fees).
79. See, e.g., Florida: Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1976);
Georgia: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1967) (applying
Georgia law), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968); Missouri: Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co.,
360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950); Oregon: Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978) (only where the insurer assumes actual defense of the
claim); Utah: Beck v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Virtually alone, Kansas and Louisiana have foreclosed the possibility of tort damages when insurers breach this
duty in bad faith. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611
P.2d 149 (1980); Bye v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 164 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 320 So. 2d 208 (La. 1975).
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imposition of excess liability, and his rights and responsibilities
are limited to those set forth in his contract."0

Consequently, parties to first-party contracts are debtor and creditor; they are adversaries, and fiduciary obligations do not attach.81
Their relationship is unlike those under liability insurance, where
the parties are "on the same side" in defending against claims of a
third party."2
In recent years, jurisdictions rejecting a first-party tort action"
have found additional justification for doing so in statutory
schemes designed to regulate insurers and penalize grossly unethical conduct.8 4 In D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania National Mutual
Casualty Insurance Co.,85 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied
heavily on the putative effectiveness of statutory sanctions in declining to recognize a new tort predicated on a bad faith refusal to
pay. In a bitter dissent, Justice Larsen pointed out the facetiousness of the majority rationale.86 He concluded that the statutory
scheme was clearly inadequate to deter insurer misconduct because
the maximum possible penalty was only a $5,000 fine. 7 Moreover,
even if a fine were imposed, the proceeds would accrue to the state,
thus providing no compensation for the injured insured. 8 This
80. Santilli v. State Farm Ins. Co., 278 Or. 53, 61-62, 562 P.2d 965, 969 (1977). However,
the court did recognize that unequal bargaining power of the parties encourages insurers to
exploit the insureds' exigent circumstances-compelling them to settle for less. Id. at n.5.
Moreover, despite the dicta quoted herein, the court did leave open the possibility that it
might recognize the new tort of bad faith in a proper case, but in Santilli, the court stated
"it is not necessary for us to decide" the issue because because "plaintiff would not . . .
prevail on such a cause of action even if we were to adopt it." Id. at 62, 562 P.2d at 969.
81. Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 317 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1975).
82. See SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 5.03, at 5-6.
83. Id.
84. A position taken by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 614, 392 A.2d 576, 581 (1978).
85. 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966 (1981).
86. Id. at 509, 431 A.2d at 973 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
87. Id. Pennsylvania's Unfair Insurance Practices Act provides that a violation has occured when an insurer refuses "to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation"
or "not attempting in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of
claims in which the company's liability under the policy has become reasonably clear." 40
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1171.5(a)(10)(iv) & (vi) (Supp. 1987). These provisions are enforceable
only by the insurance commissioner who can seek judicial imposition of a civil penalty to a
maximum of $5,000 for each "knowing violation." 40 PA. CONS. STAT, § 1171.11(1) (Supp.
1987).
88. Justice Larsen noted that no penalty had been imposed in this case. D'Ambrosio, 49
Pa. at 509, 431 A.2d at 973. Further, state regulatory agencies have yet to demonstrate the
ability, or more probably the willingness, to penalize insurers for engaging in statutorily
proscribed conduct. See D. CADDY, LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN INSURANcE REGULATION (1986).
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would be so even if one were to assume that the penalties would be
rigorously applied, itself a questionable assumption.89 Finally, Larsen persuasively argued that the majority misconstrued the statute
which, he asserted, was not intended to limit any other remedies
the insured might possess.
Whatever the rationale, the effect of judicial refusal to impose an
independent fiduciary duty on first-party insurance is to limit an
insured's potential recovery to the sum originally due under the
contract plus interest and reasonable attorney's fees. Logically, insurers could be held liable for extra-contractual damages under
well-established contract doctrine.90 Yet those courts which refuse
to recognize a tort action have consistently refused to do so. A classic example is Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance

Co.'" Kewin involved an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay $6,500 in
disability benefits. The jury awarded the insured the amount due
under the contract in addition to $75,000 for mental distress and
$50,000 in exemplary damages. The intermediate appellate court
reversed the punitive award but upheld recovery for mental distress on the theory that, because the contract involved a matter of
mental concern, such was a natural and foreseeable consequence of
the breach.2 The Michigan Supreme Court, however, reversed the
decision, expressly rejecting the lower court's theory by holding
that disability policies are commercial contracts.'3 Mental distress,
the court held, did not arise naturally from the breach, nor was it
reasonably within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. Thus, after years of protracted litigation, Kewin
recovered only the $6,500 originally due under the contract-clearly a "bargain from the company's point of view."'" Decisions like Kewin can serve only to encourage insurers to deliberately deny legitimate first-party claims.
Indeed, state regulators are dominated by insurance interests; in 1986, 50 percent of all
insurance commissioners were employed in the industry prior to taking office and more than
50 percent return to it after leaving public office. Id. at 34. This "revolving door" impedes
effective regulation. Id. at 35. The United States Justice Department has reached similar
conclusions. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, FEDERAL-STATE REGULATION OF THE PRICING AND
MARKETING OF INSURANCE

(P. MacAvoy ed. 1977)). Consequently, the argument that state

enforcement of statutory mandates is sufficient to deter insurer misconduct, thus eliminating the need for a first-party tort action, is specious indeed.
89. D'Ambrosio, 494 Pa. at 509, 431 A.2d at 973 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
90. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
91. 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980).
92. Id. at 403, 295 N.W.2d at 52.
93. Id. at 405, 295 N.W.2d at 55.
94. D'Ambrosio, 494 Pa. at 509, 431 A.2d at 973 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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In a separate dissenting opinion to Kewin, Justice Williams
hotly disputed the majority's reasoning. 5 He argued that disability
insurance is indeed a personal contract obtained to "promote peace
of mind" and to "avoid the insecurity and anguish of being disabled without a paycheck to meet the normal demands of life." 6
Mental distress is thus a natural and foreseeable consequence of an
insurer's bad faith failure to pay and hence should be recoverable
under a contract theory. Challenges like Justice Williams' place jurisdictions that still reject extra-contractual recovery under increasing pressure to conform their doctrine to the realities of modern life.

II.

FLORIDA LAW: IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE?

Until recently, Florida has upheld an often criticized distinction
between the duty owed by insurers to their tortfeasor insureds, and
that owed to first-party claimants. In 1982, the Florida Legislature
modified this common law dichotomy with the enactment of section 624.155, 97 which, when definitively construed by the Florida
courts, should restore consistency while deterring insurer
misconduct.
A.

The Case Law: A Bad Faith Dichotomy

For decades, Florida has imposed a duty on liability insurers to
act in good faith and to deal fairly with tortfeasor insureds.9 s Because the insurer has control over the insured's defense, the insurer is required to act with "due regard" for the interests of the
insured. 9 This fiduciary obligation is not dependent on the contract, but arises by law from the relationship between the parties. 100 Thus, where an insurer breaches its duty'0 ' (typically by
refusing a reasonable settlement within policy limits) it may be lia95. Kewin, 409 Mich. at 408, 295 N.W.2d at 57 (Williams, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (Supp. 1986) (amending FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (1985)).
98. See Auto. Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938); see also American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962) (insurer acted in bad
faith when it refused to settle claim against its insured after it knew a verdict as to liability
would be directed, most probably producing an excess judgement).
99. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 922 (1981). Although the standard for insurer liability is bad faith "in handling the
defense of claims against its insured, [the insurer] has a duty to use the same degree of care
and diligence as a person of ordinary care and prudence should exercise in the management
of his own business." Id. (citations omitted).
100. Shaw, 134 Fla. at 830-31, 184 So. at 859.
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ble for the excess, and, in a proper case, compensatory °2 and punitive damages. 10 3
However, Florida courts have not adopted a similar rule with regard to first-party insurance.10 4 Insurers owe no fiduciary duty in
handling such claims.0 5 The parties are debtor and creditor. Thus,
an insured who has been wrongfully denied first-party benefits is
limited to an action on the contract.' 06 Extra-contractual damages
are not available unless the insured can prove an independent tort
such as fraud or the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 0
This unequal treatment and the distinction on which it rests has
been roundly criticized. Dissenting in Baxter v. Royal Indemnity
Co., Justice Dekle failed to "perceive a valid distinction between
the ... third party right of action and a cause of action [for an]
08
insurer's bad faith failure to settle" the claim of its own insured.1
Indeed, he found the dichotomy indefensible:
101. In Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1975), the
court noted that bad faith rather than negligence was the standard for determining liability.
Id. at 530-31. Bad faith is a question of fact for the jury to decide whether the insurer has
failed to act in good faith with due regard for the interests of the insured. Gutierrez, 386 So.
2d at 785.
102. Compensatory damages cannot be recovered, however, absent physical injury unless
punitive damages are also justified. Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816, 819
(Fla. 1976).
103. "Punitive damages are recoverable ... to serve the predominant function of deterrence and punishment .... to vindicate wrongs arising from anti-social behavior ... [as] the
most satisfactory way to correct evil-doing in areas not covered by the criminal law." Campbell, 306 So. 2d at 531. In Butchikas, the court raised the standard for punitive damages in
such cases by holding that punitive damages are warranted in an "excess judgment" case
where the insurer engaged in "concealment," "misrepresentation," or a "continued course of
dishonest dealing." Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 817 (quoting Campbell, 306 So. 2d at 532).
Prior to this decision the standard was malice, wantonness or outrageous conduct. See
Campbell, 306 So. 2d at 532.
104. See Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975); Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla.
1983).
105. Baxter, 317 So. 2d at 726 ("there is no fiduciary relationship ... the parties occupy
a debtor-creditor type relationship for purposes of this class of insurance protection").
106. See Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA),
review denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983).
107. Id. The court interpreted World Insurance Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1975), as limited to its facts and stated that "even deliberate refusal to pay a legitimate claim will not justify a punitive award." Id. at 68. In Wright, the court held that a
disability insurer's actual and threatened bad faith, including attempts to "buy up" the
policy, constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and upheld a jury verdict
awarding $40,000 in compensatory damages. Wright, 308 So. 2d at 612-13.
108. 317 So. 2d 725, 729 (Fla. 1975) (Dekle, J., dissenting).
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It would be anachronistic to hold that an insurer owes a duty of
good faith in handling the liability claim of a third person totally
unrelated to the parties to the contract of insurance while at the
same time holding that the insurer owed no such obligation of
good faith to its own insured, who has paid premiums ...

specific purpose of protecting himself .... 109

for the

Justice Dekle emphatically argued that Florida should treat thirdand first-party claims in the same manner; "Ujustice" and "public
policy" demand it." °
In Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., a
federal district court did interpret Florida law as recognizing a
first-party bad faith action."' The court reasoned that, since Florida recognizes the duty of an insurer to act in good faith and accept reasonable settlements of third-party claims, "[l]ogically, the
Florida courts would also accept the [other] 'aspect of the same
duty' requiring the insurer to act fairly and in good faith in handling the claims of its own insured.""' 2 Subsequently, however, in
Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Romer," 3 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal expressly, though not enthusiastically, rejected this view; " 4 a decision the supreme court refused to
5
review."
Romer was a minister injured while trying to help a member of
his congregation change a flat tire. He filed a claim under the personal injury protection (PIP) provisions of his automobile insurance policy. Although its liability was clear, the insurance company
refused to pay. Romer brought suit alleging breach of an affirmative duty of good faith, a breach which allegedly caused him to
suffer mental anguish and emotional distress. The trial court allowed the issue of bad faith to go to the jury. It found for the
preacher and awarded him $35,000 in compensatory and $250,000
in punitive damages." 6
109. Id. at 729.
110. Id. at 731.
111. 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
112. Id. at 1370.
113. 432 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983).
114. Id. at 68. The court was "not without sympathy for an insured who is clearly covered by his or her policy, yet encounters stubborn refusal to admit coverage." It agreed with
the Escambia court that "a policy holder buys insurance coverage, not a potential court
battle." Id. at 69. Nevertheless, it was "left in little doubt that the conclusion we come to
now is the law of this state in all of our courts." Id. at 68.
115. 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983).
116. Romer, 432 So. 2d at 67.
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The Fourth District Court reversed. It held that Florida does not
recognize a tort cause of action for "mere bad faith refusal" to pay
a first-party claim." 7 Bad faith conduct constitutes only a breach
of contract, the court held, and extra-contractual damages are not
available absent an independent tort. This is the common rule in
Florida today.118
B.

Legislative Change: Florida'sNew Bad Faith Statute

In 1982, the Florida Legislature enacted section 624.155, the socalled bad faith statute." 9 It provides that "[any person may
bring a civil action against an insurer when such person is damaged" 2 by an insurer who commits a statutory violation by "[n]ot
attempting in good faith to settle claims when . . . it could and

should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its
insured and with due regard for his interests."'' An insured who
prevails under this section is entitled to damages, court costs and
reasonable attorney's fees.' 2 '
117. Id. Thus, the court was unable to redress the insurer's misconduct, which included:
deliberate refusal to pay, delay in paying the judgment for a lesser sum, failure of its counsel
to appear, and the interposition of "spurious" affirmative defenses. Id. at 68-69.
118. Id. at 68. See also Kent Ins. Co. v. Hassan, 447 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984);
Smith v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 441 So. 2d
633 (Fla. 1983).
119. FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (Supp. 1986) (amending FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (1985)). The statute states in pertinent part:
(1) Any person may bring a civil action against an insurer when such person is
damaged:
(b) By the commission of any of the following acts by the insurer:
1. Not attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circumstances,
it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured and with due regard for his interests;
(4) No punitive damages shall be awarded under this section unless the acts giving
rise to the violation occur with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice and these acts are:
(a) Willful, wanton, and malicious;
(b) In reckless disregard for the rights of any insured; or
(c) In reckless disregard for the rights of a beneficiary under a life insurance
contract.
Any person who pursues a claim under this subsection shall post in advance the
costs of discovery. Such costs shall be awarded to the insurer if no punitive damages are awarded to the plaintiff.
120. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1) (1985 & Supp. 1986).
121. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b)1 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
122. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(3) (1985 & Supp. 1986).
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The legislature constructed section 624.155 to make actual consequential damages readily recoverable while imposing a higher
standard for punitive damages, mitigating the possibility of "runaway awards." Punitive damages are available where "the acts giving rise to the violation occur with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice, ' 123 and when these acts are "[w]illful,
wanton and malicious, ' 124 and "[uin reckless disregard for the
125
rights of any insured.'
To date, no Florida court has applied or definitively construed
section 624.155.126 However, in a concurring opinion in Romer,
Judge Hurley noted:
[A]lthough it need not be decided here, it is arguable that with
the passage of this legislation [§ 624.155], Florida has joined the
ranks of those states which impose an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts. If this is so, then
proof of a breach of the covenant, would permit recovery in tort
27
in first party, as well as third party, insurance claims.
Subsequently,-a federal court in Rowland v. Safeco Insurance

Co.' 2a relied on section 624.155 to reject Safeco's motion to dismiss

a bad faith tort claim. The court held that section 624.155(1)(b)1
created a new cause of action for bad faith refusal to pay a legitimate first-party claim. 12 It did so based on the plain meaning of
the statute and its legislative history which showed a clear intention to impose a fiduciary obligation on insurers with regard to all
130
(not just third-party) claims.
123. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(4) (1985 & Supp. 1986).
124. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(4)(a) (1985 & Supp. 1986).
125. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(4)(b) (1985 & Supp. 1986) (emphasis supplied).
126. See Rowland v. Safeco Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 613, 615 (M.D. Fla. 1986) ("[tlhere
have been no cases interpreting FLA. STAT. § 624.155").
127. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 69 n.5 (Fla. 4th DCA)
(Hurley, J., concurring specially) (citation omitted), review denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla.
1983).
128. 634 F. Supp at 613.
129. Rowland, 634 F. Supp. at 614-15 ("The enactment of FLA. STAT. 624.155(1)(b)1 ...
created an independent cause of action for bad faith refusal to pay").
130. Id. at 615. The court quoted from a 1982 Staff Report to the House Committee on
Insurance which stated that section 524.155
requires insurers to deal in good faith to settle claims. Current case law requires
this standard in liability claims, but not in uninsured motorist coverage [firstparty claims]; the sanction is that a company is subject to a judgement in excess
of policy limits. This section [624.155] would apply to all insurance policies.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Several months later, in United Guaranty Residential Insurance Co. v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 3 ' District Judge Black further
developed the analysis originally set forth in Rowland. The court
held that the plain meaning of section 624.155(1)(b)1 authorizes a
new tort action where insurers are guilty of bad faith handling of a
legitimate first-party claim. The court logically reasoned that the
statute alters the common law by imposing a fiduciary duty, independent of the contract, to "all claims," which obviously includes
benefits owed directly to insureds. It explicitly rejected the insurer's contention that section 624.155 was not intended to change
the common law but to codify it.'3 2 Further, under well-established
Florida law, the court found no need to apply specific rules of statutory construction because the "words used by the legislature are
clear and convey a definite meaning."' 33 A close reading of the
statute and its legislative history leaves little doubt that the federal court's interpretation is correct3 even when applying appropriate rules of stafutory construction.1 4
A key issue addressed in neither Rowland nor Alliance Mortgage
is punitive damages. Under subsection 624.155(1)(b)1, punitive
awards are not available unless the insurer's actionable conduct
constitutes "a general business practice."' 3 5 Similar statutory pro131. 644 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
132. Id. at 341. The court stated:
[This court notes] for purposes of clarification its disagreement with United's application of the rule for statutes in derogation of common law. United contends
that the legislature's intention to alter the common law is not "plainly pronounced" because it did not expressly include first party actions. However, Florida courts presume that the legislature is fully cognizant of the case law governing
subjects on which it is legislating. By opting not to exclude first-party actions
from the broad coverage of subsection (1)(b)l while fully aware of the majority
rule permitting such actions, the legislature unequivocally stated that all badfaith refusals to settle would be actionable.
Id. at 342 n.4 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
133. Id. The court cited Kokay v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA
1980), aff'd, 398 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1981).
134. Other rules of statutory construction support the court's interpretation: "statutes
governing insurance contracts [should] be liberally construed so as to protect the public."
Praetorians v. Fisher, 89 So. 2d 329, 333 (Fla. 1956). More generally, "the rule requiring
remedial statutes to be construed liberally in favor of the party for whose benefit the statute
was enacted would require a finding of statutory coverage in this case." Alliance Mortgage,
644 F. Supp. at 342 n.4. (citing Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Meekins, Inc., 219 So. 2d 439
(Fla. 3d DCA 1969)). Additionally, "the rule that requires presumption of substantive
change whenever the legislature amends a statute would preclude a finding that the legislature merely sought to codify the common law rule relating to third party actions." Id. (citing
Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1981)).
135. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 69 n.5 (Fla. 4th DCA)
(Hurley, J., concurring specially), review denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983).
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visions have been variously interpreted in other jurisdictions. In
Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 36 the California Supreme Court held that "a single violation knowingly committed is.
. .sufficient.' 137 However, in Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co., the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected
this interpretation. 13 8 It held that only multiple statutory violations in the same case, or a showing of numerous separate violations by the same insurer would be sufficient to constitute proof of
a general business practice. 139 However, this general business practice reqtiirement must be interpreted by Florida courts so as to
make punitive damages a realistic possibility, otherwise the deterrent effect of the statute is significantly diluted and the will of the
legislature thwarted.
III.

CONCLUSION: AN ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE

Florida clearly needed to eliminate its common law dichotomy
between the treatment of third- and first-party claims, and did so.
Florida now recognizes a first-party tort action predicated on an
insurer's bad faith refusal to pay-making injured insureds whole
and preventing future harm by deterring insurer misconduct. 4 " A
136. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
137. Id. at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (construing CAL. INS. CODE §
790.03(h) (West 1972 & Supp. 1973)).
138. 167 W. Va. 597, 280 S.E.2d 252 (1981). In pertinent part, W. VA. CODE 33-11-4(9)
(1985) provides:
Unfair claim settlement practices.-Noperson shall commit or perform with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the following:
(d) Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based
upon all available information;
(f) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
(g) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims
for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered;
W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4-(9)(d)(f)(g) (1985).
139. Jenkins, 167 W. Va. at 611, 280 S.E.2d at 260. The court went on to recognize an
implied cause of action arising from violations of the statute where the insurer's misconduct
indicated a general business practice. Id. at 258. The court did so even though, unlike section 624.155 of the Florida Statutes, the West Virginia statute did not provide for such a
private cause of action.
140. See FLA. STAT. § 624.155(b)(1) (Supp. 1986).
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contract remedy alone is simply inadequate to accomplish these
objectives:
Absent the threat of a tort action, the insurance company can,
with complete impunity, deny any claim they wish, whether valid
or not. During the ensuing period of litigation following such a
denial, the insurance company has the benefit of profiting on the
use of the insured's money. [Without a tort] the only compensation a successful insured could expect through litigation was the
belated payment of his claim and the possibility of recovering attorney fees . . 1..

By enacting section 624.155, the Florida Legislature has extended the fiduciary obligation long imposed on liability insurers
to bind all insurers; insurance companies now have a legal duty,
independent of the contract, to handle the claims of all insureds in
good faith. Therefore, once an insurer violates subsection
624.155(1)(b)1 by deliberately and unreasonably denying firstparty coverage, the insured has a cause of action which contem142
plates the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.
The enactment of section 624.155 is a step forward because it
eliminates the case law's formalistic dichotomy between third- and
first-party claims. This unequal judicial treatment of first- and
third-party insurance relationships is "anachronistic" and logically
indefensible. 143 First, it ignores the reasonable expectation of insureds that "a good-faith claim will receive good-faith treatment. 1 44 Indeed, the common law rule allows first-party insurers
to mass market themselves as fiduciaries, collect the premiums and
then assume an adversarial posture when an insured rightfully
sought return performance.14 5 Contract law generally does not per141. Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 340, 306 S.E.2d 616, 619
(1983). Consequently, the court held:
[Ihf an insured can demonstrate bad faith or unreasonable action by the insurer in
processing a claim under their mutually binding insurance contract, he can recover consequential damages in a tort action. Actual damages are not limited by
the contract. Further, if he can demonstrate the insurer's actions were willful or in
reckless disregard of the insured's rights, he can recover punitive damages.
Id. Thus, South Carolina joined the evergrowing number of jurisdictions which recognize a
first-party tort action when insurers act in bad faith.
142. See FLA. STAT. §§ 624.155(1), (4) (1985 & Supp. 1986).
143. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
144. Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 317 So. 2d 725, 731 (Fla. 1975) (Dekle, J., dissenting).
145. See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 178 (Iowa 1975)
("[wie would be derelict in our duty to administer justice if we were not to judicially know
that modern insurance companies have turned to mass advertising to sell 'protection' ").
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mit such conduct; promissory estoppel prevents a party from denying express representations on which others have detrimentally
relied.""'
Second, the dichotomy assumes that an excess judgment is a
greater potential evil than the consequences from withholding
first-party benefits, justifying a fiduciary duty in the former situation but not in the latter.14 7 When a liability insurer breaches its
duty to an insured tortfeasor, a cause of action arises. The insured
does not need to satisfy the full judgment as a condition precedent
to a bad faith action'" contemplating the recovery of the excess,
and potentially compensatory and punitive damages.1 4 ' In the interim, at worst, the insured must live with the possibility that he
or she may not prevail and will remain liable for the excess
judgment.
On the other hand, when an insurer wrongfully and deliberately
withholds first-party benefits, the consequences are immediate. In
such cases an insured may: (1) be denied essential surgery or therapy; 5 0° (2) be forced to exhaust a lifetime's hard-earned savings
and seek humiliating public assistance; 5 ' (3) lose his business;"5 2
(4) have to watch a close relative needlessly suffer;15 ' and (5) even
be left financially unable to pay for the burial of a deceased loved
one. 54 The foregoing parade of horribles is by no means exhaustive, and unlike instances where a liability insurer fails to accept a
Yet, under the debtor-creditor rationale, Florida's courts have allowed first-party insurers to
be "good neighbors" and "good hands people" when selling their policies and collecting the
premiums but stubborn, stingy debtors when an insured files a legitimate uninsured motorist claim. See Kent Ins. Co. v. Hassan, 447 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Smith v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983);
Saltmarsh v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 344 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); MacDonald
v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
147. See Baxter, 317 So. 2d at 726 & n.3.
148. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615, 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)
("[W]e hold that prior satisfaction of the excess judgment is not a prerequisite to bringing
an action against one's insurer for damages due to ... bad faith in failing to settle a claim
within the policy limits.").
149. See Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1976).
150. See discussion of Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103,
113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974), supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
151. See discussions of Jarvis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 N.H. 648, 448 A.2d 407 (1982),
supra note 70; Poling v. Wisconsin Physicians Serv., 120 Wis. 2d 603, 357 N.W.2d 293 (Ct.
App. 1984), supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
152. See Silberg, 11 Cal. 3d at 452, 521 P.2d at 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
153. See Jarvis, 122 N.H. at 648, 448 A.2d at 407; Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio
St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).
154. See Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916 (Ala. 1981).
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reasonable settlement of a third-party claim, these disastrous effects are actual, not hypothetical. Such exigent and egregious situations are further aggravated by time-consuming litigation, since
insurers have an incentive to delay, aware their ultimate liability is
assuredly limited.'5 5

Third, a fiduciary duty is imposed on liability insurers when defending tortfeasor insureds, because they are tempted to refuse
reasonable settlements, "gamble" on the results of litigation, and
thereby expose the insured to an excess judgment. 151 With firstparty claims, the incentive to act unethically is even greater; it is
no "gamble" at all. Furthermore, by wrongfully denying coverage,
the insurer may be able to exploit the insured's dire circumstances
to coerce a highly-favorable settlement or avoid its contractual obligation entirely. At worst, the insured sues, prevails on the contract, and recovers the sum originally due, plus interest and reasonable attorney's fees. In any event, what is a "bargain from the
company's point of view" is often a personal tragedy for the insured. 151 Moreover, such tactics often force insureds onto the welfare rolls, wrongfully draining the public treasury. The common
law rule permits insurers to maximize their profits by shunning
their obligations, externalizing the cost, and profiting from their
own misconduct.
Finally, section 624.155 encourages self-reliance; it rewards insureds who have provided for themselves in the event of a catastrophic occurrence. In Butchikas v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 58

Justice England defended the majority's refusal to permit the recovery of damages for mental distress unless punitive damages
were justified by noting that "in 'excess' cases the fact and degree
of financial exposure are brought about by the insured's decision to
risk the financial and emotional consequences which naturally flow
from .

. .

. insufficiency of coverage."' 59 In first-party cases, how-

ever, the insured has procured sufficient coverage, but it is the inpay from which the disastrous "consesurer's bad faith refusal to
60
quences naturally flow."'
155. See Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 248 (Miss. 1977).
156. See discussion of Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 278 Or. 53, 61-62, 562 P.2d
965, 969 (1977), supra note 80.
157. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 509, 431
A.2d 966, 973 (1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
158. 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1976).
159. Id. at 819.
160. Id.
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In the near future, a Florida court will address this issue and
construe subsection 624.155(1)(b)1. It should do so consistent with
the legislature's objective in enacting section 624.155. It is clear
that the legislature intended to eliminate the antiquated common
law dichotomy between third- and first-party claims, and to create
a new tort cause of action in favor of Florida's insureds, injured
when insurers deliberately refuse to pay legitimate first-party
claims. Justice and a consistent public policy demand no less.'

161. See Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 317 So. 2d 725, 731 (Fla. 1975) (Dekle, J.,
dissenting).

